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Abstract4
We consider the evolution of cognition and the emergence of creative behaviour, in relation to5
vocal communication. We address two key questions: 1) what cognitive and/or social mechanisms6
have evolved that afford aspects of creativity? 2) has natural and/or sexual selection favoured hu-7
man behaviours considered “creative”? This entails analysis of “creativity”, an imprecise construct:8
comparable properties in non-humans differ in magnitude and teleology from generally-agreed human9
creativity. We then address two apparent problems: 1) the difference between merely novel productions10
and “creative” ones; 2) the emergence of creative behaviour in spite of high cost: does it fit the idea that11
females choose a male who succeeds in spite of a handicap (costly ornament); or that creative males12
capable of producing a large and complex song repertoire grew up under favorable conditions; or a13
demonstration of generally beneficial heightened reasoning capacity; or an opportunity to continually14
reinforce social bonding through changing communication tropes; or something else? We illustrate15
and support our argument by reference to whale- and birdsong; these independently evolved biological16
signal mechanisms objectively share surface properties with human behaviours generally called “cre-17
ative”. Studying them may elucidate mechanisms underlying human creativity; we outline a research18
programme to do so.19
1 Introduction20
One of the defining features of humanity is the ability to be creative. This ability is exhibited throughout21
human society, and is a fundamental force in the development of humankind. However, the concept of22
creativity itself is shrouded in imprecision and subjectivity, making it difficult to address from a scientific23
perspective. One approach to the rational study of creativity in humans is to consider it from an evolu-24
tionary perspective, aiming to identify related behaviours in other species that can be studied without the25
cloud of human subjectivity that the word creativity entails.26
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Evolution, for the purpose of our argument, refers to the process of the gradual change of form and27
behaviour, as a result of differential advantages of some forms or behaviour over others. In the case of28
biological evolution, we talk of fitness and mean the numbers of offspring produced and surviving. In29
the next section, we decompose the idea of creativity into tractable components, to allow us to examine30
whether music and other forms of vocal communication (including language in humans) share similar31
functional roots and may have evolved out of similar cognitive precursors. Whether a society values or32
eschews creativity, whether we agree on what constitutes good or bad music, or where one stands in the33
balance between humans as cognitive individuals and humans as cultural components, is secondary to34
understanding the essence of the concepts.35
2 Components of Creativity36
2.1 Valuing creativity and creating value37
We begin our decomposition of creativity with the relationship between perceived creativity and attributed38
value.39
In Western society, “creativity” is most commonly used to refer to the embodied cognitive process40
that gives rise to pieces of music, sculptures, paintings, poems, and other things that are taken or pre-41
sented as art. We, less conventionally, include science and engineering in our list of creative endeavours.42
Creativity is intensely context dependent: reproducing the style of Monteverdi in the 20th Century would43
be regarded negatively as pastiche or plagiarism or an exercise of style replication. Creativity is heavily44
dependent on the nature of the creator: for example, Harold Cohen’s AARON painter program [1] has45
made paintings that have hung in galleries and sold for thousands of dollars; his daughter was (in 1999)46
also a keen artist, producing (then) the kind of drawings one might expect from a 3-year-old, for which47
most people would not be inclined to pay. Cohen, however, rates his daughter’s creativity as much greater48
than that of his program [2]. Accordingly he makes a distinction between Big-C creativity and Little-49
C creativity, also seen elsewhere in the literature [2], where Big-C is Picasso level, and Little-C is what50
AARON can manage. Margaret Boden [3] makes another perhaps more tractable distinction between psy-51
chological creativity—the act of generating an artefact that is novel and of value to an individual—and52
historical creativity—that of generating an artefact that is novel and valued in historical terms. However,53
this notion must be generalised: rather than two discrete kinds of creativity, value and novelty should not54
be thought of as simple quantities, but as relations between observers and the created artefact. Thus, for55
example, we can account for cycles of fashion: retro styles may be valued by both teenagers and their56
parents, the former enjoying their (relative) novelty and the latter doing exactly the opposite. We return57
to the matter of novelty below.58
Value is dependent not only on the observer, but also on the context in which the observation is made.59
It is present in many more pursuits than the artistic ones mentioned above, and in manifold ways. A60
prime example is mathematics, where the creation of the proof of a theorem is more highly valued if61
it is “elegant”, according to the principles of the particular branch of mathematics to which it applies;62
mathematics has its own aesthetics, as does engineering. Often, the aesthetic of one context is utterly63
incomprehensible, and even offensive, to observers comfortable in another: consider, for example, the64
riot that followed the premie`re of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring in the 1920s. Thus, the value relation65
is between not just the observer and the artefact, but between the observer and the artefact in a given66
context. Finally, value is also a function of the creator. Expectations are based on past experience. We are67
disappointed when our favorite author, admired musician or best-loved car company turns out a product68
that underperforms.69
In summary, we treat value as a relation between an artefact, its creator and its observers and the70
context in which creation and observation take place.71
2
2.2 Exploration, Transformation and the Paradigm Shift72
Boden [3] also introduces an important philosophical distinction, between exploratory creativity, where73
the conceptual space being explored is fixed (though possibly not all visible, and possibly infinite) and ex-74
ploration occurs within that space (for example, different songs in a particular style), and transformational75
creativity in which the space itself is subject to change (developing from one style to another). Coupled76
with successful persuasion, transformational creativity is what leads to a paradigm shift in Kuhn’s phi-77
losophy of science [4]. Boden proposes that Little-C creativity is exploratory, and Big-C creativity is78
transformational, but history is littered with exceptions to this: Mozart, for example, perfected a style79
that Haydn introduced, but Mozart is universally regarded as the greater creator. Wiggins [5] shows80
that, in any case, transformational creativity is formally exploratory creativity at the meta-level, where81
the conceptual space of artefacts is replaced by the conceptual space of conceptual spaces. This way of82
thinking, where the conceptual space can be taken to define the class of artefacts at which a creator is83
aiming, yields some elegant ways of discussing what happens when a creator pushes the boundaries of84
the expected, in a process taxonomised as different kinds of aberration by Wiggins [5]. This concept85
allows further objective, mechanistic, description and prediction of creative behaviour [5].86
Humpback whale song has a nearly invariant pattern of theme transitions, so much so that Frumhoff87
[6] called the few backwards transitions therein “aberrant” (though the common terminology here is co-88
incidental). There also are three different kinds of theme in humpback song. The variation in structure is89
somewhat like a theme and variations; but they recur, so while they fit Boden’s exploratory framework,90
their generation is not as free as that term might suggest. However, a restricted exploration of a (no-91
tionally) larger language can be modelled in this context as a conceptual space accompanied by a value92
measure, which filters out unvalued artefacts; we return to this below.93
2.3 Creativity: process or property?94
Boden’s approach raises some interesting questions concerning the conceptual space, and the attribution95
of value to artefacts in it: these things are separable, and the conceptual space is neutral with respect to96
both value and novelty: it inherently captures cognitive generation, not the subsequent value or novelty of97
that which is generated. Thus, the paintings of Harold Cohen (for he was a successful human-only artist98
before AARON), and of AARON, and of Cohen’s daughter, all co-exist, equally, in the conceptual space99
of paintings: it is only when they are evaluated by an observer (possibly the artist) that issues of novelty100
and value arise. In a less Western-centric perspective, we might conflate these two and argue that novelty101
is a kind of value, since in some cultures it does not have the high status accorded in the West, and in102
some it is actively eschewed in favour of the strict maintenance of tradition. This feature of creativity in103
the social context does not decrease the importance of novelty in the evolutionary context, as we shall see104
below.105
Thus, we see that the production of the painting per se is not what guarantees its value: while, of106
course, the artefact must exist to be valued, it is interaction between production and (probably, at least107
initially, introspective) evaluation by an artist, and then by a social community, that identifies relative108
value and relative novelty, of both the artefact and the way it was made. Thus, we can decompose109
creativity into a series of steps and tests within a process, of which a “creative” agent is capable, and can110
begin to study it. This is altogether more scientifically tractable than the philosophical debate about the111
ineffable nature of creativity itself.112
2.4 Size does not matter113
Given the nature of the conceptual space as distinct from novelty and value of the concepts in the space,114
a natural question to ask is: need there be a difference in kind between big-C and little-C creativity?115
For some authors, the answer is clearly “no”: Plotkin describes creativity as the sine qua non of everyday116
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language generation [7]; for others, the word should only be applied to the great creators of great historical117
import.118
From the perspective of the current paper, this latter view is destructively problematic. We aim here to119
understand what evolutionary advantage may have been given to humans and/or animals by the ability to120
be creative. At the extreme level, it is hard to argue for evolutionary advantage in the authorship of very121
large scale created constructs such as symphonies. However, it has been argued that sexual selection may122
be a factor in smaller creativity [8, 9]. Thus, if we were to restrict our definition to great human creators,123
ruling out minor creative acts, we would also rule out a priori the possibility of incremental development124
of creative faculties over evolutionary time. Instead, it is necessary to look for the roots of that ability125
both in humans and non-humans, with a view to understanding how the extreme (“great creativity” in the126
terms of the relevant culture) emerged from the ordinary (everyday creative activity). One unbiased way127
of approaching the question how creativity evolved is thus to deconstruct the components and explore128
which ones exist in non-human animals and to what degree.129
Equally, there is no scientific evidence to support the position that the ability to create did not evolve,130
step by step, as opposed to merely appearing fully formed in humans, and there is evidence of creativity131
or proto-creativity in other species, both in animals belonging to the same direct evolutionary lineage [10]132
and those more distantly related [11]. Therefore, when studying the development of creativity in our own133
and other species, it is necessary to admit and value the creation of less-than-amazing artefacts (as we134
do in our children) in order to encompass the overall development of the faculty, over evolutionary and135
ontogenetic time.136
2.5 Novelty and its Perception137
We now consider another key dimension of creativity, novelty, and the ability to perceive it. In Western138
culture, as we argue above, the attribution of creativity entails the attribution of novelty—various authors139
have argued that the human creative drive is the search for novelty [12], or, differently termed, curiosity140
[13]. While this is not the case in all cultures, the fact remains that novelty detection is a feature of141
creative behaviour—whether it is a feature to be valued or (in some contexts) suppressed. Regardless of142
one’s response to novelty, the fact that one can respond to it means that it can be detected, and we propose143
that this is a fundamental component of creative behaviour. It is to be noted, however, that too much144
novelty prevents recognition, a fact embodied in the famous Wundt curve of hedonic response to novelty145
[14, 15]: the inverted-U shape captures the notion that not enough variation is boring, while too much is146
unpleasantly incomprehensible, yielding a sweet spot in between. This is illustrated in Figure 1.147
Novelty detection is a requirement for noticing changes in the environment, a feature all animals need148
for survival. When a pattern deviates from the known, it is novel and can signal good things (a new149
food source) or bad things (a new type of predator). Thus, animals need carefully to balance exploration150
of novelty, because it can open up new niches that enhance evolutionary fitness or are detrimental to it.151
The ability to detect novelty in the environment likewise allows animals to detect novelty in behaviour of152
conspecifics. Famous examples are the cultural transmission of novel behaviour through a population, as153
observed for sweet potato washing in Japanese Macaques and opening the aluminum foil covers of milk154
bottles by chickadees [16].155
Huron [17] extends this argument to affective response, exapted to music. Because the outcome of156
a novel experience is sometimes dangerous, it is appropriate for an animal to be alert and prepared for157
fight or flight in the face of novel circumstances. Thus, there is evolutionary incentive to perceive not158
just danger, but uncertainty and/or novelty in their own right. In humans, this situation is experienced as159
tension, leading to arousal and, in extremis, to fear, and simple observation suggests that other species160
share the same affective response. The experience of tension entails its subsequent release, which seems161
to be accompanied by positive affective states. Huron, following Meyer [18], suggests that tension thus162
stimulated by expectation, and its denial or fulfilment, is in large part responsible for affect stimulated by163
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Figure 1: The Wundt Curve illustrates the rise and fall of preference (y-axis) in perceivers for complexity
of stimulus (x-axis). Very simple stimuli are uninteresting, while extremely complex ones are unaccessi-
ble, either case producing dissatisfaction. Intermediate levels of complexity, however, are preferred.
Western music, whose emotive content is frequently theoretically conceived as an ebb and flow of tension164
of various kinds. This affective experience is highly valued, and is altogether more subtle and dynamic165
than the common labelling of emotional analysis of music as “tender”, “sad”, etc. [19, 20].166
It is possible to mathematically model expectations over a well-defined symbol system (musical167
melodies constructed from a known range of pitches and durations, or bird- or whale-song categorised into168
appropriate symbol sets) using uncomplicated statistical techniques [21, ch. 9]. From these models, hu-169
man melodic expectations can be estimated [22, 23] and birdsong can be modelled [24]. Pearce’s model170
of Western tonal musical melody, IDyOM (Information Dynamics of Music) [25, 23], predicts human171
expectations very well (r = .91 in four studies) [26, 27]. Expectations are expressed as probability dis-172
tributions over the set of symbols allowed (musical pitches, here). Given such a probability distribution,173
we can estimate the unexpectedness of an event drawn from it, using Shannon’s information theory [28].174
It is important to understand that this property is relative: it is computed in terms of the statistical model,175
so unexpectedness is relative to the information that the model contains about the set of sequences being176
modelled, and to the immediately precedent sequence. Thus, we can model an individual’s memory, and177
predict the unexpectedness of perceived events. Two quantites, entropy and information content, model178
uncertainty and unexpectedness, respectively [23]. More recent work on physiological and behavioural179
measures of human response to live music suggests that the unexpectedness value of pitch, calculated as180
above, explains a significant part of the variance in physiological measures (heart rate, skin conductiv-181
ity) that correspond with arousal [29]. This constitutes evidence that unexpectedness in music correlates182
with arousal in listeners, and that both correlated with the predictions of the model. These model-driven183
empirical methods can be applied to any form of vocal communication, given enough examples.184
Ikebuchi et al. [30] showed that female Bengalese finch hearts respond with tachycardia to more185
complex male song (that is, song with higher information content). This is a result comparable with the186
human musical response outlined above [29]. Further investigation of these phenomena via the models187
introduced in Section 3 may yield understanding of the relationships between the birds’ reaction to song188
and the humans’ reaction to music.189
Weiss et al. [31] found that when nightingales heard a playback consisting of song types with branch190
transition patterns, they responded with song types with bottleneck transition patterns. Conversely, when191
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they heard song types with bottleneck transition patterns, they responded with song types that tended to be192
branching transitions in their population—that is, they responded with the unexpected. While it remains193
unclear why this behaviour would arise, the fact that it does so entails the ability to detect high and low-194
entropy distributions, and/or high and low information content, as in Pearce et al.’s human studies and195
Huron’s evolutionary argument.196
Here, then, is a scientific question which the study of creativity can ask: do other species than hu-197
mans exhibit similar responses to novelty and/or complexity, and, if so, how does their behaviour inform198
our understanding of our own? Given a sufficient amount of song produced by a particular species, or199
even individual, we can construct a model of the sequences, using the above techniques, and generate200
new sequences from it, with particular information-theoretic properties (e.g., surprising, neutral, or very201
obvious). We can monitor the response of the relevant animal to the constructed sequence, by means of202
judicious audio editing, and thus test hypotheses regarding the value of novelty and complexity in vo-203
cal display. This view of song construction raises the possibility that it is valued by its own species for204
some of the same reasons that humans value music: the affect of rising and falling tension caused by205
unexpectedness/information content/complexity. This is a testable hypothesis, to which we return below.206
3 Modelling the Process of Creativity207
In order to study creativity effectively, we need a rigorous frame of reference, including the ability to sim-208
ulate perception and creative generation. Historically, there are not many scientific theories of creativity,209
and those that do exist are fundamentally qualitative. We now survey them, in contrast with a newer,210
quantitative approach.211
Wallas [32] focuses on the cognitive process of creativity. He identifies four parts of a sequence:212
Preparation, in which the creative goal is identified and considered; Incubation, during which conscious213
attempts at creativity are not made; Illumination, the moment of enlightenment when an idea appears in214
conscious awareness, sometimes called the “Aha!” moment; and Verification, in which the new idea is215
applied. These ideas highlight a further distinction that is useful in focusing on creativity: that between216
conscious, or deliberate, creativity and non-conscious, or spontaneous, creativity [33]. The former of217
these is the creativity where, for example, a professional composer must produce a TV theme in too short218
a time to wait for inspiration: she consciously applies rules of her craft to create what is necessary. The219
latter is the creativity where an idea or concept appears in one’s awareness, apparently without bidding,220
effort or intention, in the way described by Mozart as the beginning of his mode of creativity (Holmes,221
2009). Most human creativity processes, including Mozart’s overall description, are probably a cyclic222
combination of the two. Wallas, however, is considering spontaneous creativity resulting from earlier223
conscious consideration, and he considers the illumination point to be the arrival of a spontaneously224
produced concept in consciousness: the “Aha!” moment. Wallas’ theory requires created artefacts to225
undergo Validation, where they are examined to make sure they are fit for purpose. This may suggest that226
the theory is meant to account for larger-scale acts of creativity than, for example, spontaneous sentence227
production; or maybe successful communication of meaning would fulfil the definition in this example.228
In any case, the theory does not propose an underlying mechanism, but rather describes a series of stages.229
As such, it at most provides an overarching framework for the study of creativity.230
Guilford’s model [34] is more qualitative, but does not contradict Wallas. Guilford proposes a phase231
of divergent thinking, where possibilities are opened, followed by one of convergent thinking, in which232
the creator homes in on her idea. Both phases could happen either consciously or non-consciously, and233
one can also imagine repeating cycles of the two phases. The model has less predictive power than234
Wallas’, however, and we will not refer to it further. More recently Csikszentmihalyi [35] described the235
subjective experience of creativity, involving the state of flow; again, this lacks quantitative analysis and236
predictive power. A final theory worthy of mention is that of Koestler [36]: the cognitive operation of237
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bisociation is proposed, enabling cognitive structures representing two or more ideas to be combined to238
produce new concepts. This theory, though convincing, is not specified with mathematical precision.239
None of the four frameworks outlined above affords a quantitative means to examine creative pro-240
cesses in detail. A more recent hypothetical mechanism for a cognitive creative process is provided by241
the Information Dynamics Of Thinking (IDyOT) cognitive architecture [33, 37], based on Baars’ Global242
Workspace Theory [38] and using the same information theoretic notions as the Information Dynamics243
of Music (IDyOM) model cited above [23]. The key idea is that cognitive creativity is a result of pre-244
diction, which itself is a means for managing information and action in the world. Statistical generators245
continually predict outcomes from sensory inputs, based on statistical models trained by unsupervised246
observation. They compete in terms of the information content of their predictions (quantified in terms of247
Shannon Information Theory [28]) for access to the Global Workspace (GW), which equates with con-248
scious awareness. When an item enters the GW, it may be novel, or it may be a predictable part of an249
on-going experience; in the former case, creativity has happened, and passage into the GW corresponds250
with Wallas’ moment of Illumination, the preceding activity being Incubation. What enters the GW is251
recorded in memory and becomes available for future prediction, and thus the cycle repeats. This theory252
gives a concrete mechanism for creative production, and is applicable directly to discrete and continuous253
symbolic data represented on a computer. Thus it can be applied to transcriptions of bird- and whale-254
song, with a view to comparing their information-theoretic properties. This approach, then, can be used255
directly on real data to make testable predictions about animal behaviour, as it has done for humans.256
4 Affording Creative Behaviour257
Charles Darwin described two primary mechanisms of selection as driving biological evolution: natural258
selection and sexual selection. The critical elements for evolution by natural selection are variation in259
traits within a population, differential reproduction of animals with the differing traits, and inheritance260
of the trait from one generation to the next. Sexual selection can be viewed as special case of natural261
selection which acts on an individual’s ability to mate. Some traits, for example ones that increase fighting262
ability, may improve an individual’s ability to compete with members of the same sex for mating, while263
others, such as ornaments or song, may make a member of the other sex more likely to select an individual264
for mating.265
The topic of mate choice is important for our discussion of selection for creative behavior, especially266
for creativity in communication. Biologists have investigated a variety of modes of sexual selection for267
mate choice. The simplest selection would be for a character that provides a direct benefit, such as if a268
female bird chooses a male whose genes produced a tail of the optimal size for flight. But suppose males269
also use the tail in a display to impress females. Females might have a sensory bias to choose males with270
even larger tails than optimal for flight, because the display is more visible [39]. Here sexual selection271
might drive the evolution of tails that are longer than optimal under natural selection. And if a population272
of females have a preference for longer tails, then this could lead to a runaway process of evolution of273
longer and longer tails until the benefit from sexual selection is outweighed by other natural selection274
pressures [40]. The evolution of large complex ornaments in males raises the question of why a female275
should choose a male with a trait that may make it more visible to predators and less able to escape.276
Zahavi [41] argued that males with such a handicap might have to be better quality, thus suggesting that277
handicaps help a female choose a better quality male.278
How does creative behaviour fit onto these categories? Creative behaviour could result in biological279
selective advantage in all the above cases. Perhaps the most celebrated case of animal innovation in-280
volves a young female Japanese macaque who invented the idea of washing the sand off potatoes in the281
ocean and then three years later, the idea of separating grain from sand by throwing the mixture in water282
and scooping out the floating grain. Both of these innovations would be selected because they improve283
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foraging. This kind of innovation is particularly important in species capable of social learning so that284
beneficial innovations diffuse through the population. Creative behaviour may also be the substrate for285
sexual selection: mimicking the sounds of other birds and adding them to his own repertoire of song may286
signal to the female lyre bird that her mate has particularly good cognitive skills that will also help to287
raise their young and pass on his intelligence as well. This logic has been applied to a more specific issue288
for the songs of birds. Nowicki et al. [42] pointed out that the nuclei in the brain that control song develop289
during critical periods of development. If a young bird does not have adequate nutrition at this time, it290
may suffer broader developmental problems. They reasoned that large and complex repertoires of song291
may indicate a history of good nutrition, and they suggest that females might select males with large and292
complex song repertoires for this reason [42]. Or creative behaviour could evolve as byproduct of some-293
thing else: the need to explore to find new food sources or new territories might have selected animals294
that are less neophobic, and more curious, leading to more novel behaviours—not all of them necessarily295
beneficial to survival and reproduction. Thus, the expense of creative behaviour in terms of time, energy,296
and risk, which might at first seem problematic, can be motivated in biological terms, either in terms297
of introducing beneficial behaviors, creating a particularly attractive display, or as a demonstration of a298
valuable capacity that underlies creativity itself.299
However, while the substrate of the variability required for biological evolution, as exemplified above,300
is genetic, the behaviours we are considering are complex, learned and cultural, involving not just gener-301
ation of short sequences grounded in action, but substantial long-term abstract sequence production. The302
larger question is therefore: why and when is there selection for innovation - forming new combinations303
of behaviors, vs reliance on unlearned behaviors or social learning of successful behaviors. Laland [43]304
discusses strategies animals might use for selecting when to rely on unlearned behaviors, when and who305
to copy in social learning, and when to innovate. However, he is primarily considering intrumental behav-306
iors for solving non-social problems rather than learning about signalling for communication. We now307
consider cases of animal communication that appear to be examples of creative behaviour in the terms308
proposed here, and then discuss how the dynamics of the communication might be quantitatively studied309
using a computational framework such that we propose.310
5 Creativity in Animal Communication311
The very attribution of the word “song” to the vocal communication behaviours of birds and whales is312
based on the problematic Romanticisation of that phenomenon, akin to the Romanticisation of creativity,313
mentioned above. First, then, we must dissociate ourselves from the metaphorical notion of theatrical or314
concert-hall performance, and focus instead on the functional, communicative aspects of the behaviours.315
A comparable danger is the naı¨ve assumption that the behaviours described below are due to the same316
mechanisms as superficially similar behaviours in humans. Indeed, this claim is one we would like to317
test. One means of doing so might be through the observation-based model of Wallas [32]. However, it is318
hard to know whether the Preparation and Incubation phases exist in animals: they cannot be asked, and319
current lack of understanding of the human mechanisms at the neural level is not detailed enough to make320
search for comparable effects in animals possible: we are currently limited to measures such as EEG321
frequency band power, which do not explain mechanism (e.g., [44]). Illumination and Verification may322
be more accessible because they may manifest behaviourally, e.g. when an animal immediately repeats323
material once it has been internalised. More work is needed in this area.324
However, there is evidence, cited above, of the effect of information content and entropy with re-325
spect to a context on humans, measurable directly from physiological responses [29], and of information326
content on birds [45]. A more direct comparison of these two phenomena can be made, using the tripar-327
tite empirical approach used by Pearce et al. [27]: a computer program is used to embody the proposed328
mechanism, and its predictions are then tested empirically with both behavioural responses and electro-329
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physicological measures; here, the idea is extended to a comparison between species.330
The setting in animal communication where the concept of creativity seems most relevant concerns re-331
productive advertisement displays called “songs”, which are a product of sexual selection. In some animal332
species, the songs of each individual singer are learned through listening to the songs of other individuals.333
When one individual learns the song of another, it will probably not be a perfect copy, as there may be334
errors in the stored memory, and differences in the vocal production apparatus between individuals. This335
process of vocal copying within a community of animal singers leads to vocal traditions—which may be336
formalised as conceptual spaces—that often map onto habitats as geographical dialects in song; similar337
effects of vocal tradition, coupled with migratory patterns, arise in human folk music [46]. However,338
there are also situations when an animal actively appears to innovate, producing sounds that are more339
novel than would be expected to arise from copy errors alone, in a step akin to transformational creativity.340
Existing work in this area focuses on what is copied, at the expense of studying the “unrecognisable” new341
material: the corollary, invention of new song types, seems not to have been studied formally.342
Kroodsma [47] suggests a relationship between site fidelity and mode of vocal learning in birds,343
high site-fidelity being correlated with imitation and low site-fidelity correlated with improvisation. One344
possible explanation for this would be the need to associate a clear signal with territory, so as to mark345
it, but also for the signal to vary as fledglings leave the nest and lay out their own territorial boundaries:346
it is necessary first to innovate and then to fix, so as to identify a difference between the territories,347
while maintaining recognisability to members of one’s own species for the purposes of sexual attraction.348
Similarly, in animals such as killer whales that form groups bonded by call repertoires, innovation is349
concomitant with the need to form new social groups as new individuals mature: otherwise, groups could350
not distinguish themselves. In both these cases, the ability to recognise and value “just enough” variation351
is paramount. This notion of “just enough” corresponds with the maximum of the Wundt curve, described352
above; it also corresponds with a middling, moderate value of information content, as measured by the353
models outlined in Section 3.354
The development of song through vocal learning is common among songbirds but very rare among355
non-human mammals [48]. Some of the best evidence comes from the songs of bats [49] and humpback356
whales. At any one time, the songs of different individuals within a population of whales are quite357
similar [50], but many acoustic features of the songs change rapidly enough that they can be tracked from358
month to month [51]. The changes are progressive over time in the sense that if a sound is increasing359
in frequency, or decreasing in duration, that trend is likely to continue for some time rather than vary360
randomly. The rapidity of the song change coupled with the similarity between whales at one time makes361
it difficult to identify whether some individuals are innovators who are copied, especially since it is so362
difficult to make repeated recordings from the same individual at different times given such a large and363
mobile population. However it is clear that a strong pressure for conformity must drive each whale to364
copy the song of the moment, while at the same time there must be a selection for specific innovations365
that are picked up by the population to change the vocal tradition. Until now, there has been no way366
of studying this process or identifying the benefits and process of innovation. Computational modelling367
based on creativity theory may help.368
Following the Boden analysis of creativity, and our subsequent suggestion that value and novelty369
should be thought of as relations between observers and the created artifact, we can evaluate differences370
in the value of novel sounds produced by different singers in terms of whether they are copied by others371
or not. We know little about the psychological process by which an individual animal generates a novel372
sound nor about what “value” the sound may offer to that individual. But in parallel with our explicitly373
relativistic version of Boden’s “historical” creativity, we can study what novel sounds are incorporated374
into the vocal tradition of the population, modelling the whale song as a conceptual space.375
A striking case of adoption of novel songs involves the song of the humpback whale. There are376
two populations of humpback whales that winter off the coast of Australia: one on the east coast and377
one on the west. Males sing on their winter breeding grounds and as they migrate to and from the378
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breeding grounds. These two populations are separated by thousands of km. With little interchange, each379
population is characterized by one song at any one time, and the songs of the two populations are usually380
very different. However, Noad et al. [11] noticed an unusual pattern in 1996 when 2/82 singers recorded381
off the east coast produced a song that was completely different from the rest of this population but that382
matched the 1996 song of the west coast population.383
During 1997, some songs mixed features of both west and east coast, but by the end of the year nearly384
all of the east coast whales had switched to singing west coast song. By 1998, no whales were left singing385
the old east coast song and all had switched to the west coast song. The rarity of west coast songs recorded386
in the east during 1996, coupled with the following independent evolution of the west coast song on both387
coasts, led Noad et al. [11] to conclude that only a few singers transferred from west to east during 1996,388
bringing the new vocal tradition with them. This rapid and complete replacement of one vocal tradition389
with another suggests recognition of a value for very specific kinds of novelty is what drives the change390
in the song, even when this is usually a less radical process driven from within the population.391
Analysis of songs recorded during 1998-2008 from eastern Australia and the other populations of392
the South Pacific show a remarkable pattern. Garland et al. [52] report that over this time period, eight393
different song types originated in the eastern Australia population and spread over several years across 6394
humpback populations from west to east, all the way to French Polynesia, 5000 km away. They suggest395
that as with the uptake of a new song as reported by Noad et al. [11], diffusion of a vocal tradition occurs396
when individual males from adjacent populations spend enough time together for one to learn the others’397
song [52]. However, this does not explain the directionality of information transfer. Available data on398
movement of individuals from one population to adjacent ones suggest that this is bidirectional with no399
bias to the east. The suggestion of Garland et al. for the remarkable directionality of the change is that400
the eastern Australia population is much larger than the others. While this may account for a more likely401
flow of animals from eastern Australia to the adjacent population to the east, it fails to account for the402
broader eastward pattern of information flow.403
One way to think about this pattern from the current perspective would be to consider the value of404
particular innovations within the context of a particular vocal tradition at a particular time. The 1998405
song in eastern Australia was the song originally from western Australia that was valued so highly that406
it swept through the population in 1997. At this point, this song started to evolve within the eastern407
Australia population, and at the same time, its high value made it likely to spread to populations to the408
east. Given the time this took and the speed at which song evolves within a population, the large eastern409
Australia population had an advantage in being more likely to offer high value changes within the shared410
vocal tradition, and these high value changes would maintain the directionality as they spread to other411
populations to the eastward. Once this dynamic was set up, if the easternmost populations were several412
years behind in the process of innovation and selection for value, then it was less likely for any innovations413
in this setting to spread west.414
There has been growing interest in studying the strategies animals might adopt when they learn from415
others. Laland [43] points out that the costs and benefits of social learning depend on the context, and he416
suggests more attention be paid to strategies of when to copy and whom to copy. One when strategy sug-417
gests copying another singer when the copier’s current behaviour is unproductive. From the perspective418
of a singer, this would suggest copying if you are not attracting females or if you are failing in competition419
with males. A whom strategy might be “copy the majority,” which would lead to conformist behaviour.420
Another whom strategy is “copy the most successful”: if singing whales can monitor the success of oth-421
ers, and if successful whales have variations in their song, this could drive a process of change, although422
it is difficult to see how it would lead to the progressive evolution observed most of the time in humpback423
song. We still do not understand what drives the conformity in humpback song, what drives the selection424
of specific novelties, and how or whether this is driven by sexual selection.425
The movement and variation of whale-song bears comparison with the movement of human music426
during migration. Pamjav et al. [46] conducted a large study of musical melody styles for 31 Eurasian427
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nations. They found that close musical relations indicate close genetic relations (FST < 0.05 [53]) with428
probability 82%. This is one of the largest studies ever done of folk music, and almost certainly the largest429
computational study: they used databases of 1,000–2,500 melodies for each of the 31 cultures. The notion430
of musical similarity here revolves round a Euclidean distance metric derived from a Self-Organising431
Map (SOM [54]), and this is an area requiring further validation: musical similarity is strongly context432
dependent, and the workings of a SOM are somewhat inscrutable. Nevertheless, this work presents an433
interesting opportunity, given the models of music that we propose, to compare the whalesong behaviour434
with the human musical behaviour in detailed and explicable ways.435
6 A research programme on creativity in vocal communication in436
humans and non-humans437
In this paper, we have identified parallels between human and animal vocal communication behaviours,438
at the immediate phenomenological level, and suggested that they are worthy of further investigation in439
the context of creativity research.440
We decomposed the notion of creativity into an objective process of generation, coupled with a com-441
bination of relative value judgements, some of which, notably novelty, can be objectively modelled. This442
added objectivity allows us to ask questions that were not previously scientifically formulable, regard-443
ing the nature of vocal communication, its effect on humans and other species, and the mechanisms that444
underlie it.445
We have deployed Boden’s philosophical approach to human creativity [3] to hypothesise a possible446
explanation for new song construction in migrating whales, and identified evidence of music migration in447
humans. We have presented evidence, from normally separate research fields, of comparable physiologi-448
cal responses to aural sequence perception in birds and humans, which might suggest similar processes at449
deeper levels, suggesting a computational method by which these empirical studies can be implemented.450
We propose, therefore, that, when we examine the evolution of vocal communication in animals451
and humans from the perspective of creativity, we can shed new light on processes which seem to be452
common (though probably not commonly derived) between very distantly related species. Therefore, we453
suggest that the philosophical framework outlined here is a potentially fruitful means of addressing the454
communicative behaviour of animals that improvise (individually or collectively), and perhaps thence455
understanding better the mechanisms that underlie human communication and human creativity.456
More specifically, we can propose457
• comparative studies on heart rate and other physiological and electrophysiological measures in458
birds and in humans in response to complex aural stimulation, relative to a known vocal communi-459
cation form; subsequent neural studies to seek neural correlates of information content [27];460
• comparative studies on the dynamics of whale migration and song variation as compared with the461
dynamics of human migration and song variation; subsequent modelling to compare the processes,462
novelty and complexity involved;463
• the development of new measurement techniques to allow physiological and neural analysis of464
birds, whales, and other improvising animals to be compared with human analysis, and thence465
modelled as we have described above.466
We believe that these approaches and others entailed by questioning the relationship between creative467
behaviour in humans and the superficially similar behaviours in other species offer a new and exciting468
approach to understanding the cognitive mechanisms involved both in vocal communication and in cre-469
ativity.470
11
Acknowledgements471
We gratefully acknowledge the advice and support of Bjo¨rn Merker and two anonymous reviewers in472
assembling this paper. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Lorentz Centre, Leiden, The473
Netherlands, whose workshop on Music and Evolution made this paper possible. GAW is funded by the474
Lrn2Cre8 and ConCreTe projects, which acknowledge the financial support of the Future and Emerging475
Technologies (FET) programme within the Seventh Framework Programme for Research of the Euro-476
pean Commission, under FET grant numbers 610859 and 611733. PLT acknowledges the support of the477
MASTS pooling initiative (The Marine Alliance for Science and Technology for Scotland). MASTS is478
funded by the Scottish Funding Council (grant reference HR09011) and contributing institutions.479
References480
[1] McCorduck P. AARON’S CODE: Meta-Art, Artificial Intelligence and the Work of Harold Cohen’S481
CODE: Meta-Art, Artificial Intelligence and the Work of Harold Cohen. Freeman; 1991.482
[2] Cohen H. Colouring without seeing: A problem in machine creativity. AISB Quar-483
terly. 1999;102:26–35. Available from: http://crca.ucsd.edu/\˜hcohen/cohenpdf/484
colouringwithoutseeing.pdf.485
[3] Boden MA. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson;486
1990.487
[4] Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 1962.488
[5] Wiggins GA. A Preliminary Framework for Description, Analysis and Comparison of Creative489
Systems. Journal of Knowledge Based Systems. 2006;19(7):449–458. Available from: http:490
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2006.04.009.491
[6] Frumhoff P. Aberrant songs of humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae): clues to the structure492
of humpback songs. In: Communication and behavior of whales. AAAS Selected Symposia Series.493
Boulder: Westview Press; 1983. p. 81–127.494
[7] Plotkin H. Evolution in Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1998.495
[8] Bown O, Wiggins GA. From Maladaptation to Competition to Cooperation in the Evolution of496
Musical Behaviour. Musicæ Scientiæ. 2009;13:387–411. Special Issue on Evolution of Music.497
[9] van den Broek EMF, Todd PM. Evolution of rhythm as an indicator of mate quality. Musicae498
Scientiae. 2009;13:369–386.499
[10] Miller GF. Protean primates: The evolution of adaptive unpredictability in competition and500
courtship. In: Whiten A, Byrne RW, editors. Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evalua-501
tions. vol. Xii; 1997. p. 312–340.502
[11] Noad MJ, Cato DH, Bryden MM, Jenner MN, Jenner KCS. Cultural revolution in whale songs.503
Nature. 2000;408:537.504
[12] Martindale C. The Clockwork Muse: The Predictability of Artistic Change. New York: Basic505
Books; 1990.506
[13] Saunders R. Curious Design Agents and Artificial Creativity. The University of Sydney; 2001.507
12
[14] Wundt WM. Grundzu¨ge der physiologischen Psychologie. W. Engelman; 1874.508
[15] Margulis EH, Beatty AP. Musical Style, Psychoaesthetics, and Prospects for Entropy as an Analytic509
Tool. Computer Music Journal. 2008;32(4):64–78.510
[16] Shettleworth SJ. Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior. USA: OUP; 2010.511
[17] Huron D. Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation. Bradford Books. Cam-512
bridge, MA: MIT Press; 2006.513
[18] Meyer LB. Emotion and Meaning in Music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1956.514
[19] Skowronek J, McKinney MF, van de Par S. Ground truth for automatic music mood classifica-515
tion. In: Dannenberg R, Lemstro¨m K, editors. Proceedings of ISMIR 2006; 2006. Available from:516
\url{http://ismir2006.ismir.net/PAPERS/ISMIR06105_Paper.pdf}.517
[20] Juslin PN, Sloboda JA. Handbook of music and emotion: theory, research, applications. Affective518
Science. Oxford University Press; 2010. Available from: http://books.google.co.uk/519
books?id=1N85AQAAIAAJ.520
[21] Manning CD, Schu¨tze H. Foundations of Statistical Natural Language Processing. Cambridge, MA:521
MIT Press; 1999.522
[22] Conklin D, Witten IH. Multiple Viewpoint Systems For Music Prediction. Journal of New Music523
Research. 1995;24:51–73.524
[23] Pearce MT, Wiggins GA. Auditory Expectation: The Information Dynamics of Music Perception525
and Cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science. 2012;4(4):625–652.526
[24] ten Cate C, Okanoya K. Revisiting the syntactic abilities of non-human animals: natural vocaliza-527
tions and artificial grammar learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological528
Sciences. 2012;367(1598):1984–1994. Available from: http://groups.lis.illinois.529
edu/amag/langev/paper/ten2012revisitinggsc.html.530
[25] Pearce MT. The Construction and Evaluation of Statistical Models of Melodic Structure in Music531
Perception and Composition. Department of Computing, City University, London. London,UK;532
2005.533
[26] Pearce MT, Wiggins GA. Expectation in Melody: The Influence of Context and Learning. Music534
Perception. 2006;23(5):377–405.535
[27] Pearce MT, Herrojo Ruiz M, Kapasi S, Wiggins GA, Bhattacharya J. Unsupervised Statistical536
Learning Underpins Computational, Behavioural and Neural Manifestations of Musical Expecta-537
tion. NeuroImage. 2010;50(1):303–314.538
[28] Shannon CE. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal. 1948 July539
and October;27:379–423, 623–56.540
[29] Egermann H, Pearce M, Wiggins G, McAdams S. Probabilistic models of expectation violation541
predict psychophysiological emotional responses to live concert music. Cognitive, Affective, &542
Behavioral Neuroscience. 2013;13(3):533–553. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.543
3758/s13415-013-0161-y.544
[30] Ikebuchi M, Futamatsu M, Okanoya K. Sex differences in song perception by Bengalese finches as545
measured by cardiac response. Animal Behavior. 2003;65:123–130.546
13
[31] Weiss M, Hultsch H, Adam I, Scharff C, Kipper S. The use of network analysis to study complex547
animal communication systems: a study on nightingale song. Proceedings of the Royal Society B.548
2014;281(1785):1–9.549
[32] Wallas G. The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt Brace; 1926.550
[33] Wiggins GA. The Mind’s Chorus: Creativity before Consciousness. Cognitive Computation.551
2012;4(3):306–319.552
[34] Guilford JP. The Nature of Human Intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1967.553
[35] Csikszentmihalyi M. Creativity : Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention. New York:554
HarperCollins; 1996.555
[36] Koestler A. The Act of Creation. London: Hutchinson & Co.; 1964.556
[37] Wiggins GA, Forth JC. IDyOT: A computational theory of creativity as everyday reasoning from557
learned information. In: Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines. Atlantis558
Thinking Machines. Atlantis/Springer; 2015. In preparation.559
[38] Baars BJ. A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press; 1988.560
[39] Endler JA, Basolo AL. Sensory ecology, receiver biases and sexual selection. TREE.561
1998;13(10):415–420.562
[40] Fisher RA. The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1930.563
[41] Zahavi A. Mate selection – A selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 1975;53:205–564
213.565
[42] Nowicki S, Peters S, Podos J. Song learning, early nutrition, and sexual selection in songbirds. Am566
Zoologist. 1998;38:179–190.567
[43] Laland KN. Social learning strategies. Learning and Behavior. 2004;32:4–14.568
[44] Schwab D, Benedek M, Papousek I, Weiss EM, Fink A. The time-course of EEG Al-569
pha Power Changes in Creative Ideation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 2014;8(310).570
Available from: http://www.frontiersin.org/human_neuroscience/10.3389/571
fnhum.2014.00310/abstract.572
[45] Okanoya K. Behavioural Factors Governing Song Complexity in Bengalese Finches. International573
Journal of Comparative Psychology. 2012;25:44–59.574
[46] Pamjav H, Juha´sz Z, Zala´n A, Ne´meth E, Damdin B. A comparative phylogenetic study of genetics575
and folk music. Molecular Genetics and Genomics. 2012;287(4):337–349.576
[47] Kroodsma DE. Acoustic Communication in Birds. New York: Academic Press; 1983.577
[48] Janik V, Slater PJB. Vocal learning in mammals. Advances in the Study of Behavior. 1997;26:59–99.578
[49] Morell V. When the bat sings. Science. 2014;344(6190):1334–1337. Available from: http:579
//www.sciencemag.org/content/344/6190/1334.short.580
[50] Guinee LN, Chu K, Dorsey EM. Changes over time in the songs of known individual humpback581
whales (Megaptera novaeangliae). In: Payne R, editor. Communication and Behavior of Whales.582
AAAS Selected Symposia Series. Boulder: Westview Press; 1983. p. 59–80.583
14
[51] Payne K, Tyack P, Payne R. Progressive changes in the songs of humpback whales (Megaptera584
novaeangliae): A detailed analysis of two seasons in Hawaii. In: Payne R, editor. Communication585
and Behavior of Whales. AAAS Selected Symposia Series. Boulder: Westview Press; 1983. p. 9–57.586
[52] Garland EC, Goldizen AW, Rekdahl ML, Constantine R, Garrigue C, Hauser ND, et al. Dynamic587
horizontal cultural transmission of humpback whale song at the ocean basin scale. Current Biology.588
2011;21(8):687–691.589
[53] Wright S. Evolution and the Genetics of Populations. vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press;590
1969.591
[54] Kohonen T. Self-Organizing Maps. vol. 30 of Information Sciences. Heidelberg: Springer; 1995.592
Second edition, 1997.593
15
